Should comprehensive diagnosis include idiographic understanding? by Thornton, Tim
0 
Full Title: Should comprehensive diagnosis include idiographic understanding? 
 
Short title: Idiographic understanding 
 
Authors (i.e. name as it should appear on the paper):   
  Tim Thornton 
 
Position (i.e. job description as it should appear on the paper): 
Tim Thornton 
Professor of Philosophy and Mental Health 
 
Address for correspondence: 
 
Institute for Philosophy, Diversity and Mental Health 
University of Central Lancashire 
Preston 
PR1 2HE 
 
Other Contact Details: 
phone 01772895412  
fax  01772892964 
email: 
TThornton1@uclan.ac.uk 
 
Key-words (not appearing in title): 
 
Philosophy, psychiatry, comprehensive diagnosis, Windelband, nomothetic. 
 
Word count (excluding title page but including references): 
 
~ 6,600 
 
Character count (abstract):  
   
Software used: Microsoft Word 
 
Filename(s): 
1 
Should comprehensive diagnosis include idiographic understanding? 
Abstract 
The World Psychiatric Association has emphasised the importance of idiographic 
understanding as a distinct component of comprehensive assessment but in introductions to 
the idea it is often assimilated to the notion of narrative judgement. This paper aims to 
distinguish between supposed idiographic and narrative judgement. Taking the former to 
mean a kind of individualised judgement, I argue that it has no place in psychiatry in part 
because it threatens psychiatric validity. Narrative judgement, by contrast, is a genuinely 
distinct complement to criteriological diagnosis but it is, nevertheless, a special kind of 
general judgement and thus can possess validity. 
To do this I first examine the origin of the distinction between idiographic and nomothetic in 
Windelband’s 1894 rectorial address. I argue that none of three ways of understanding that 
distinction is tenable. Windelband’s description of historical methods, as a practical example, 
does not articulate a genuine form of understanding. A metaphysical distinction between 
particulars and general kinds is guilty of subscribing to the Myth of the Given. A distinction 
based on an abstraction of essentially combined aspects of empirical judgement cannot 
underpin a distinct empirical method. Furthermore, idiographic elements understood as 
individualised judgements threaten the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. 
In the final part I briefly describe some aspects of the logic of narrative judgements and argue 
that in the call for comprehensive diagnosis, narrative rather than idiographic elements have 
an important role. Importantly, however, whilst directed towards individual subjects, 
narratives are framed in intrinsically general concepts and thus can aspire to validity. 
Declaration of interests: none. 
Introduction 
There has been a recent growth in emphasis on the importance of idiographic understanding 
in psychiatric diagnosis and, more broadly, formulation. The World Psychiatric Association 
advocates the development of a ‘comprehensive’ model of diagnosis or assessment as part of 
its ongoing Institutional Program for Psychiatry for the Person. A WPA workgroup charged 
with formulating ‘International Guidelines for Diagnostic Assessment’ (IGDA) has published 
a guideline called ‘Idiographic (Personalised) Diagnostic Formulation’ which recommends an 
idiographic component alongside criteriological diagnosis. But these calls for an idiographic 
component risk blurring two motivations for, and two conceptions of, the kind of element that 
should be added to conventional criteriological diagnosis. In this paper I outline what these 
two conceptions are. Whilst both are directed at understanding individuals, one calls for a 
kind of individualised judgement, a notion I will attempt to explain. But it turns out to be a 
myth. The other, whilst aimed at understanding individuals, and genuinely distinct from 
criteriological psychiatric diagnosis, is not individualised but is general in a way that is 
distinct from criteriological diagnosis. 
In fact, in recent pronouncements by supporters of the WPA, both these senses are run 
together. My aim in this paper is thus not to criticise the WPA’s Program for Psychiatry for 
the Person and its call for judgement to recognise individual subjects or for psychiatric 
diagnosis, narrowly construed, to be augmented by a broader notion of psychiatric 
formulation. Nor is it to criticise their implicit suggestion that idiographic judgement should 
be construed as narrative judgement. Rather, my aim is to make this last implicit suggestion 
explicit. Idiographic judgement should be replaced by narrative judgement and the aim of 
capturing subjective experience should be construed as aided by narrative judgement which 
is, in an important sense, normative, rather than by the mythical notion of individualised 
idiographic judgement. This will help articulate what more is involved in formulation over 
diagnosis: not individualised judgement but narrative judgement. But narrative judgement, 
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unlike idiographic judgement, turns out to be general. 
To argue against the notion of individualised idiographic judgement will require a lengthy 
diversion via Windelband’s rectorial address. This might seem unnecessary and excessive. 
After all, in psychology, a distinction between idiographic and nomothetic has been 
apparently unproblematically deployed since the time of the personality psychologist G.W. 
Allport [although see Hurlburt and Knapp 2006]. It refers to a distinction between qualitative 
research based on individual case studies and quantitative cohort-based research. But in the 
context of the WPA’s Institutional Program for Psychiatry for the Person, the important 
question is precisely how is the individual to be represented in psychiatric diagnosis? What 
new element, if any, should be added to criteriological judgements? How, conceptually, might 
a qualitative approach differ from a quantitative approach? It is important to get the 
theoretical basis for a proposed change in emphasis in psychiatric diagnosis (or, rather, 
formulation) right and for this reason I will examine Windelband’s explicit introduction 
carefully. 
Background 
The World Psychiatric Association’s proposed Idiographic (Personalised) Diagnostic 
Formulation closely connects the idea of a comprehensive model of diagnosis with an 
idiographic component alongside criteriological diagnosis. 
This comprehensive concept of diagnosis is implemented through the articulation of 
two diagnostic levels. The first is a standardised multi-axial diagnostic formulation, 
which describes the patient’s illness and clinical condition through standardised 
typologies and scales... The second is an idiographic diagnostic formulation, which 
complements the standardised formulation with a personalised and flexible statement. 
[IDGA Workgroup, WPA 2003: 55] 
Juan Mezzich, President of the WPA, describes comprehensive diagnosis as follows: 
The emerging comprehensive diagnostic model aims at understanding and 
formulating what is important in the mind, the body and the context of the person 
who presents for care. This is attempted by addressing the various aspects of ill- and 
positive- health, by interactively engaging clinicians, patient and family, and by 
employing categorical, dimensional and narrative descriptive approaches in 
multilevel schemas. [Mezzich 2005: 91] 
In this passage, Mezzich assumes that an idiographic element will be provided through 
narrative.  
Writing in the journal Psychopathology, the psychiatrist James Phillips also equates narrative 
and idiographic elements and describes them both thus: 
In the most simple terms, a narrative or idiographic formulation is an individual 
account with first-person and third-person aspects. That is, the patient tells her/his 
story, with its admixture of personal memories, events and symptoms, and the story is 
retold by the clinician. The latter’s account may contain formal diagnostic, ICD-
10/DSM-IV aspects, as well as psychodynamic and cultural dimensions not found in 
the manuals. The clinician’s account may restructure the patient’s presentation, 
emphasizing what the patient didn’t emphasize and de-emphasising what the patient 
felt to be important. It will almost certainly contextualise the presenting symptoms 
into the patient’s narrative, a task which the patient may not have initiated on her 
own. Finally, the clinician will make a judgment (or be unable to make a judgment) 
regarding the priority of the biological or the psychological in this particular 
presentation, and will structure the formulation accordingly… [Phillips: 2005: 182] 
In the context of increasing emphasis on user centrality, one might object to the emphasis on 
the clinician’s work in restructuring the patient’s narrative. On the other hand, a second view 
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on the significant components of a narrative might well be an important aid to a patient. But 
here the important element in Phillips’ account is the idea that a narrative formulation and an 
idiographic formulation are one and the same thing and hence, because comprehensive 
diagnosis includes narrative elements, it also includes idiographic elements. 
This assimilation of narrative and idiographic is just what I wish to question. I will argue that 
idiographic understanding, construed as individualised judgement, is a myth. But why should 
one think that one wants to add an idiographic element – in a sense I will contrast with 
narrative – to conventional criteriological diagnosis? A nice statement of the motivation was 
provided in a referee’s comment on an earlier draft of this paper. 
[T]he real problem in diagnosis comes when the nomothetic is given too much 
emphasis. Time and time again what is required is something like the idiographic. 
Time and time again the categorical, pigeon-holing, approach to diagnosis has to be 
bent in order to accommodate the individual account. The question is merely how to 
characterise such an account. 
According to this common view, psychiatry has too often been guilty of pigeon-holing its 
subjects by attempting to subsume them under general categories. What is needed instead is a 
reaction against such categorisation and idiographic judgement seems to provide just that. The 
problem, however, is to characterise just what idiographic judgement might be. Is it really 
distinct from existing criteriological diagnostic elements? What does idiographic 
understanding comprise?  
Back to Windelband 
To address these questions I will turn to the philosopher who first introduced these terms to 
psychology and psychiatry, Wilhelm Windelband [Lamiell 1998]. Windelband introduced the 
distinction between idiographic and nomothetic in his rectorial address in 1894. Having 
explained the supposed methodological, as opposed to substantial, nature of the distinction, 
my purpose is to examine three possible interpretations of it: 
1. as a practical distinction of concrete methods; 
2. as reflecting separable elements of a metaphysical divide between the particular and 
the general; and 
3. as merely an abstraction from a unified model of judgement. 
I will argue that none is a tenable account of an idiographic approach to psychiatry and that 
adding idiographic elements would threaten the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. 
Windelband introduces his distinction by contrasting it with a distinction of subject matter.  
At present, a certain classification of disciplines which attempts to establish 
knowledge of reality is regularly employed. They are distinguished into natural 
sciences [Naturwissenschaften] and sciences of the mind [Geisteswissenschaften]. 
Stated in this particular form, I regard the dichotomy as unfortunate. Nature and mind 
is a substantive dichotomy… not equivalent to a dichotomy based on modes of 
cognition. [Windelband 1980: 173] 
Windelband argues that such a distinction is a hostage to the fortune of a metaphysical 
distinction of kind between mind and the rest of nature. In psychiatry, the interplay of both 
broadly psychological methods and neurology makes drawing such a distinction premature 
and unhelpful. Furthermore, it disguises the very significant similarities of method between at 
least some aspects of psychology or psychological psychiatry and other natural sciences. 
What is the source of the methodological relationship between psychology and the 
natural sciences? It evidently lies in the consideration that both psychology and the 
natural sciences establish, collect, and analyze facts only from the viewpoint and for 
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the purpose of understanding the general nomological relationship to which these 
facts are subject. [Windelband 1980: 174] 
Instead of a distinction based on the subject matter of study, Windelband proposes a 
methodological distinction which places psychology (as he understands it) and other natural 
sciences on one side and other disciplines, which in Germany at the time were called 
‘sciences of the mind’ but which have a distinct method, on the other. This gives rise to a 
characterisation of what he will call ‘idiographic’ as follows: 
[T]he majority of the disciplines that are usually called sciences of the mind have a 
distinctively different purpose: they provide a complete and exhaustive description of 
a single, more or less extensive process which is located within a unique, temporally 
defined domain of reality. [Windelband 1980: 174] 
Is the distinction a practical distinction? 
As first introduced, idiographic understanding concerns individual or unique cases. But, given 
that the distinction is supposed to be at the level of method not substance (including a very 
general notion of substance), this is not fixed by the subject matter – a subject matter of 
individual cases, for example – so much as how that subject matter is approached. This 
methodological distinction is made clearer in the following passages in which the term 
‘idiographic’ is first introduced: 
At this point, we have before us a purely methodological classification of the 
empirical sciences that is grounded upon sound logical concepts. The principle of 
classification is the formal property of the theoretical or cognitive objectives of the 
science in question. One kind of science is an inquiry into general laws. The other 
kind of science is an inquiry into specific historical facts. In the language of formal 
logic, the objective of the first kind of science is the general, apodictic judgment; the 
objective of the other kind of science is the singular, assertoric proposition… 
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are justified in drawing the following 
conclusion. In their quest for knowledge of reality, the empirical sciences either seek 
the general in the form of the law of nature or the particular in the form of the 
historically defined structure. On the one hand, they are concerned with the form 
which invariably remains constant. On the other hand, they are concerned with the 
unique, immanently defined content of the real event. The former disciplines are 
nomological sciences. The latter disciplines are sciences of process or sciences of the 
event. The nomological sciences are concerned with what is invariably the case. The 
sciences of process are concerned with what was once the case. If I may be permitted 
to introduce some new technical terms, scientific thought is nomothetic in the former 
case and idiographic in the latter case. Should we retain the customary expressions, 
then it can be said that the dichotomy at stake here concerns the distinction between 
the natural and the historical disciplines. However we must bear in mind that, in the 
methodological sense of this dichotomy, psychology falls unambiguously within the 
domain of the natural sciences. [Windelband 1980: 175-6] 
These passages suggest the following rough practical distinction. Nomothetic approaches are 
those that chart lawlike, or nomological, generalities. Their aim is to describe generalities. 
Idiographic understanding concerns individual cases described in non-general ways. Both are 
forms of empirical inquiry. 
This distinction fits modern psychological usage influenced by Allport in which ‘idiographic’ 
is used to describe case-study based qualitative research by contrast with quantitative cohort-
based research (although whether Allport’s use of nomothetic accords with Windelband’s is a 
matter of dispute [Lamiell 1998]). So far, however, it does not explain precisely the difference 
of method, rather than of subject matter, of idiographic approaches and thus precisely what 
new element is being called for in comprehensive diagnosis. 
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The putative distinction receives some further elaboration in the suggestion that nomothetic 
understanding concerns processes that are repeated because it concerns their invariant 
underlying form. Idiographic understanding, by contrast, concerns singular or non-repeated 
events. 
Consider… the subject matter of the biological sciences as evolutionary history in 
which the entire sequence of terrestrial organisms is represented as a gradually 
formative process of descent or transformation which develops in the course of time. 
There is neither evidence nor even a likelihood that this same organic process has 
been repeated on some other planet. In this case, the science of organic nature is an 
idiographic or historical discipline. [Windelband 1980: 176] 
This example also reinforces the methodological nature of the distinction. The same 
phenomenon can be treated as manifesting a constant underlying form (with repeatable 
effects) susceptible of nomothetic analysis or, taken as a whole, it can be thought of as a 
lengthy but single event, capable of idiographic, historical understanding. But, whilst the 
opposition to nomothetic suggests a practical distinction of sorts, it is not yet clear what 
idiographic understanding actually comprises.  
Before examining what Windelband himself says, it is worth asking whether a distinction 
could be framed in just the terms so far used. Jim Lamiell (in private correspondence) 
suggests a kind of pragmatic distinction. Idiographic understanding concerns individual cases 
described without concern for the generalizability of the terms of the description. The 
descriptions might, in fact, be generalizable, but the immediate concern of the investigator is 
not with that question.  
The problem with this suggestion is twofold. First, as an interpretation of Windelband it does 
not fit well with his advocacy of philosophy as exploring the logic of forms of knowledge by 
contrast with the psychological state of the investigator [e.g. Windelband 1980: 170]. 
Secondly, if whether an element is idiographic or nomothetic depends merely on the attitude 
of the clinician, that would not justify the call to add idiographic elements to comprehensive 
diagnosis or explain what the elements themselves would add to diagnosis. 
Windelband himself offers a number of unsatisfactory hints of an account of what idiographic 
understanding actually is. Taking history as his example, he says: 
[H]istory seeks structural forms… [Windelband 1980: 178] 
This does not, however, distinguish history from a natural scientific account of chemical 
structures couched in invariant nomological terms. He continues: 
[I]n the historical sciences,… [thought] is devoted to the faithful delineation of the 
particulars… [Windelband 1980: 178] 
Again, ‘faithful delineation’ simply adds the idea that idiographic understanding involves 
accurate description. But of what sort? In fact, the main positive account involves a simile 
with the work of creative artists: 
The historian’s task… is to breathe new life into some structure of the past in such a 
way that all of its concrete and distinctive features acquire an ideal actuality or 
contemporaneity. His task, in relation to what really happened, is similar to the task 
of the artist, in relation to what exists in his imagination. This is the source of the 
relationship between historical accomplishment and aesthetic creativity, the kinship 
between the historical disciplines and belles lettres. [Windelband 1980: 178] 
The comparison of research in the natural sciences and history will establish even 
more clearly the predominance of abstraction in natural science and of perceptuality 
in history... [T]he ultimate aim of history is always to extract and reconstruct from the 
raw material of history the true shape of the past in robust and vital clarity. History 
produces images of men and human life in the total wealth and profusion of their 
6 
uniquely peculiar forms and with their full and vital individuality preserved intact. 
[Windelband 1980: 179] 
In these passages, Windelband suggests that idiographic understanding consists in a 
particularly vivid portrayal, or imaginative recreation, of individual events. This may seem to 
specify a practically applicable distinction. Furthermore, it hints at the role of imagination in 
empathy which Jaspers argued lay at the heart of psychiatry. In fact, however, it merely 
postpones the question of how imaginative recreation is supposed to be a form of 
understanding.  
To see that imaginative recreation is not, itself, a form of understanding, consider how one 
might, for example, imaginatively recreate a situation for which one had not the least 
understanding of its meaning or significance. One might fabricate chess pieces and a chess 
board and recreate the closing moments of the 11 July 1972 Fischer Spassky chess game 
without understanding the role of the pieces, the board, the rules or strategy or even that it 
was a game. This would not amount to historical understanding. Thus imaginative recreation 
cannot be used to specify a novel idiographic element in a model of comprehensive diagnosis. 
(This suggests that there is more to empathy than mere imaginative recreation of another’s 
mental states. I will return to this point later.) 
Even taking the opposition of ‘perceptuality’ and abstraction seriously raises rather than 
answers questions: what is the relation supposed to be between perception, shorn of its 
nomothetic elements, and understanding? I will examine this point in the next section. 
Does the distinction reflect an underlying metaphysical divide? 
While contemporary use suggests that idiographic and nomothetic forms of understanding are 
practically distinguishable but not fundamentally distinct, Windelband suggests that his 
distinction goes deeper. He relates it to a fundamental metaphysical divide: 
[T]his distinction connects with the most important and crucial relationship in the 
human understanding, the relationship which Socrates recognized as the fundamental 
nexus of all scientific thought: the relationship of the general to the particular. 
[Windelband 1980: 175] 
Note first that if the relation between idiographic and nomothetic reflects the relation between 
particular and general, often called the ‘problem of universals’ in philosophy, then it cannot 
also correspond to that between history and scientific psychology. Both historical and 
scientific psychological disciplines apply general concepts to individual cases and so neither 
can be identified wholly with one or other side of a distinction between general and particular 
understood in this fundamental way. 
Nevertheless, Windelband may intend to refer to a distinction which is gestured at by the 
practical distinction between history and scientific psychology but which is better understood 
as reflecting the relation between judgements about individuals and judgements of general 
kinds. To say this is to place him, a post-Kantian philosopher, in the context of a Kantian 
problem. I will, however, summarise the problem in contemporary terms. 
Consider how, as a result of an experience of it, a subject correctly applies a concept to an 
object. They say, for example, of an object a that it has the property F. Such a judgement 
subsumes an individual object under a general concept: general because it could in principle 
apply to other objects (whether or not in practice the object is unique in respect of F). What, 
however, guides the speaker in applying F to a? Imagine that the subject grasps a rule which 
states that if any object x has features G then it can be subsumed under empirical concept F. 
The problem, however, returns at this level. What guides the subject in applying G to a? It 
seems that any general rule of concept application will replicate the original problem. 
Kant touches on this problem in the ‘schematism’ chapter of the first Critique. The main 
question of that chapter is how to apply what he calls the ‘categories’ – the hierarchy of very 
general and fundamental concepts in Kant’s philosophical system – to experience. But he also 
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deals with everyday empirical concepts. The categories present additional problems because 
as high level concepts – and unlike empirical concepts – they are ‘heterogeneous from 
empirical intuitions’ and an intermediary has to be provided to guide their application. Things 
are not as complicated in empirical cases. Nevertheless, even here Kant suggests that an 
intermediary is needed between concepts and objects: 
[I]t is [still] schemata, not images of objects, which underlie our pure 
sensible concepts... The concept of ‘dog’ signifies a rule according to which 
my imagination can delineate the figure of a four footed animal in a general 
manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as 
experience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually 
presents. [Kant 1929: 182-183] 
This does not answer the problem, however. Firstly, it is not clear what the figure or perhaps 
image of a ‘four footed animal in general’ might be like. Secondly, for any general schematic 
figure, the question of what determines that it applies to any particular dog would return. Kant 
recognises that this account does not really address the problem, commenting: 
[T]his schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances and 
their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose 
real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover. 
[ibid: 183] 
If an account couched in general terms – such as general rules for applying concepts – merely 
replicates the problem, what solution is there? Perhaps, somehow, judgements driven by 
particulars themselves shorn of general conceptual elements underpin empirical judgement. If 
so, this might provide a route to explicating idiographic understanding as deriving from a 
fundamental metaphysical problem about concept application. 
There is some evidence that Windelband regards emphasising idiographic understanding as a 
reaction against an over-emphasis on the general in the metaphysics of thought: 
The commitment to the generic is a bias of Greek thought, perpetuated from the 
Eleatics to Plato, who found not only real being but also real knowledge only in the 
general. From Plato this view passed to our day. Schopenhauer makes himself a 
spokesman for this prejudice when he denies history the value of a genuine science 
because its exclusive concern is always with grasping the specific, never with 
comprehending the general... But the more we strive for knowledge of the concept 
and the law, the more we are obliged to pass over, forget, and abandon the singular 
fact as such…  
In opposition to this standpoint, it is necessary to insist upon the following: every 
interest and judgment, every ascription of human value is based upon the singular and 
the unique... Our sense of values and all of our axiological sentiments are grounded in 
the uniqueness and incomparability of their object. [Windelband 1980: 181-2] 
The suggestion here is that examining value judgements helps to reveal the fundamental 
importance of singular cases as opposed to general kinds in our judgements about the world. 
This implies that there is an important role for a kind of judgement in which there is no 
implicit comparison – as there is with any general concept – with other cases. Such a 
judgement would be essentially particular and thus could not include general conceptual 
elements. 
Windelband’s fellow neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert also argues that value judgements are 
essentially particular or individualised. Unlike nomothetic accounts of, for example, the 
forces acting on bodies which are described and explained in general terms, judgements about 
the value of things are essentially singular or individualised judgements.  
We are concerned here with the connection of objects with values; for a 
generalizing approach the objects are free of value-connection, they are 
exemplars, replaceable… This is what happens when we free the object of all 
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connection with our interests – it becomes a mere exemplar of a general 
concept. An individualising approach is necessarily connected with the 
value-bound grasp of the object [mit der wertverbindenen Auffassung der 
Objekte]… [Rickert 1907: 354-5] 
But such an idea needs further augmentation if it is not merely to beg the key question in 
assuming that a thing’s value is not codified in general terms in the way its weight is. 
This construal of idiographic suggests an immediate problem. How can an essentially one-off 
judgement meet a general aim of medical diagnosis: validity? What sense is there to the idea 
that a judgement that does not make implicit comparison to other cases is a valid judgement? 
I will approach this through a more familiar philosophical charge. If idiographic 
understanding is modelled on judgements of individuals shorn of reference to generals then it 
is an instance of what the US philosopher Wilfrid Sellars (1912-1989) calls the ‘Myth of the 
Given’.  
Sellars uses this phrase to characterise a form of foundationalism based on experiences that 
ground, but do not themselves depend on, other conceptualised beliefs. 
One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must 
be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be 
noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of 
particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential 
knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of 
appeals for all factual claims – particular and general – about the world. It is 
important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum 
as not only noninferential, but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact, 
whether particular or general. [Sellars 1997: 68-9] 
Sellars goes on to accept that experience can provide non-inferential knowledge and that such 
experience can constitute the ultimate court of appeals for factual claims. But he denies the 
claim that they presuppose no other knowledge of particular matters of fact. The reason for 
denying this third claim is that Sellars takes there to be a dual dependence between the kind of 
knowledge expressed in perceptual reports and an overall world-view. He suggests that 
perceptual knowledge has to jump two hurdles. The first concerns the reliability of the 
perceptual report. 
The second hurdle is, however, the decisive one. For we have seen that to be the 
expression of knowledge, a report must not only have authority, this authority must in 
some sense be recognized by the person whose report it is. And this is a steep hurdle 
indeed. For if the authority of the report “This is green” lies in the fact that the 
existence of green items appropriately related to the perceiver can be inferred from 
the occurrence of such reports, it follows that only a person who is able to draw this 
inference, and therefore who has not only the concept green, but also the concept of 
uttering “This is green” -- indeed, the concept of certain conditions of perception, 
those which would correctly be called ‘standard conditions’ -- could be in a position 
to token “This is green” in recognition of its authority. In other words, for a 
Konstatierung [perceptual report] “This is green” to “express observational 
knowledge,” not only must it be a symptom or sign of the presence of a green object 
in standard conditions, but the perceiver must know that tokens of “This is green” are 
symptoms of the presence of green objects in conditions which are standard for visual 
perception. [Sellars 1997: 74-5] 
Sellars’ point here is that for a perceptual report (or for the perceptual experience reported) to 
have authority it must not only be a reliable indicator of the state of the world but also its 
subject must know that it is reliable. Such knowledge makes the report depend more generally 
on the subject’s worldview. The report cannot underpin an individualised judgement.  
More recently, John McDowell has proposed a much shorter argument against the Myth of 
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the Given [McDowell 1994]. Empirical judgements are supposed to be rationally constrained 
by the state of the world. That is how beliefs as a whole are rationally answerable to the 
world. But the only model we have of a rational reason for a belief is a relation in which both 
items related are already conceptualised. (The paradigmatic reason for a belief is another 
belief.) So if the final step in giving a reason for an empirical belief is a judgement which 
points beyond the realm of concepts – as idiographic judgements work on this interpretation – 
it will not sustain a rational friction between belief and the world.  
Thus, if idiographic understanding is understood to be a direct response to a unique and 
incomparable object, as Windelband suggests, and if that response can be abstracted away 
from, or is prior to, a conceptualised judgement, then it cannot rationally influence judgement. 
If so, it cannot be a form of valid understanding and certainly not a kind of understanding that 
might be added to a model of comprehensive diagnosis in psychiatry which aims at validity. 
Is the distinction really an abstraction from a unified model of judgement? 
Windelband asserts the independence of idiographic and nomothetic forms of understanding. 
It is implied in the examples of history and scientific psychology. But it is also explicitly 
stated in passages such as:  
[I]n the total synthesis of knowledge, which is the ultimate aim of all scientific 
research, these two cognitive moments remain independent and juxtaposed. 
[Windelband 1980: 183 italics added] 
Given, however, the difficulty in extracting a genuine distinction either from his account of 
the ‘perceptuality’ of history or from the metaphysical divide between particular and general 
concept or universal, it is worth considering whether the distinction is better understood as an 
abstraction rather than an account of two independent ingredients. What would this be like? 
Consider, as a related analogy, Kant’s account of empirical experience. Empirical content is 
the result of the interplay of two faculties. These are the faculties of ‘receptivity’ and 
‘spontaneity’ responsible, respectively, for intuitions – brute experiential intake – and 
concepts. Their interplay is described in the slogan: “Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind” [Kant 1933: 93, A51, B75]. But this is not to say that 
empirical experience can be decomposed into two independent factors: brute experiential 
intake and subsequent imposition of concepts. Again, as McDowell explains, any model of 
empirical judgement which starts with such a bare given will sever the rational connection 
between judgement and the world because the only model we have of a reason for a belief is a 
relation in which both items related are already conceptualised. Thus, while the Kantian 
slogan describes the dual dependence of judgement on experiential intake and concepts, 
neither plays a separable role. 
In fact the idea that idiographic and nomothetic elements are not practically separable is 
expressed towards the end of the rectorial address where he suggests that history also 
essentially contains nomothetic elements: 
[G]eneral propositions are necessary at every stage of inquiry in the idiographic 
sciences. And these they can borrow only – with perfect legitimacy – from the 
nomothetic disciplines. Every causal explanation of any historical occurrence 
presupposes general ideas about the process of things on the whole. When historical 
proofs are reduced to their purely logical form, the ultimate premises will always 
include natural laws of events, in particular, laws of mental events or psychological 
processes. Consider someone who has no idea at all concerning how men in general 
think, feel, and desire. It would not only be impossible for him to comprehend 
individual happenings in order to acquire knowledge of events and processes. He 
would already have failed in the critical determination of historical facts. 
[Windelband 1980: 182-3] 
If this is what is meant by the idiographic/nomothetic distinction, however, neither aspect can 
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provide a novel element to be added into comprehensive psychiatric diagnosis. 
Individualised idiographic judgement is a myth 
I have considered three ways of interpreting Windelband’s distinction between idiographic 
and nomothetic understanding. It might be a practical distinction between concrete methods 
employed in history and scientific psychology (to take two examples). But the account 
actually offered of historical methods does not succeed in articulating a genuine form of 
understanding. It might, secondly, be interpreted as a distinction of independent factors in a 
long-standing fundamental distinction between particulars and general kinds or universals. On 
this interpretation, idiographic judgement would be deployed as part of an attempt to explain 
how it is possible to frame judgements about particulars rather than general kinds. But if so, 
the model of idiographic understanding is guilty of subscribing to the Myth of the Given and 
it cannot account for the rational connection between judgement and the world. It thus 
undermines the validity of psychiatric diagnosis or formulation. Or, thirdly, it might be 
interpreted not as a distinction between two separable ingredients within judgement but an 
abstraction of essentially combined ingredients. If so, however, it does not serve to outline a 
method of improving psychiatric diagnosis by adding a distinct element to conventional 
criteriological diagnosis.  
Given the call for comprehensive diagnosis to include idiographic elements, there is no clear 
account drawn from Windelband as to what this novel element might be. Furthermore, the 
idea of one-off idiographic elements threatens the validity of psychiatric diagnosis. 
Narrative versus nomological understanding 
At the start of this paper I quoted both Juan Mezzich and James Phillips calling for 
idiographic elements to be included in a broader notion of psychiatric diagnosis or 
formulation. Both run together ‘idiographic’ and ‘narrative’. I suggested that the motivation 
for calling for idiographic judgement was a reaction to the worry that psychiatry sometimes 
pigeon-holes its subjects under general nomothetic categories. Idiographic is the supposed 
cure for over-emphasis on nomothetic elements. But I have argued that Windelband does not 
succeed in drawing a distinction of kind between nomothetic and idiographic judgement. In 
this final section I will thus turn instead to second element in Mezzich’s and Phillips’ 
accounts: narrative. Whilst narrative judgement is tied to the kind of person-centred focus of 
contemporary psychiatric care it is not tied to the uniqueness of subjects as most definitions of 
the idiographic are [cf Lamiell 1997: 125-9]. I will suggest that this familiar distinction drawn 
from the social sciences is more successful than that between idiographic and nomothetic in 
explaining how a broader notion of psychiatric formulation – rather than a narrower notion of 
criteriological diagnosis – should be framed. 
Narrative judgement contrasts with nomological or lawlike understanding or explanation not 
because it aims at one-off events but because it is normative. The appropriate contrast is not 
between the generality of nomothetic approaches and individualised judgement of particulars 
but rather between non-normative and normative descriptions. Narrative judgements thus 
answer to a different kind of internal logic to non-normative nomological accounts. In the 
vocabulary John McDowell has developed from Sellars, they belong to the ‘space of reasons’ 
rather than the ‘realm of law’ [McDowell 1994]. 
Why are narrative judgements normative? Three considerations support this claim. Firstly, 
those individual elements within narrative accounts of subjects that correspond to 
propositional attitudes are normative. An expectation, for example, defines the event that 
would satisfy it; a belief defines the state that would make it true. In forming such a 
propositional attitude, a subject adopts a normatively characterised stance to how the world is 
or will be. 
Secondly, the connections between elements of a narrative account of a subject reflect how a 
subject ought to think and act. They answer, in Donald Davidson’s phrase, to the ‘constitutive 
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ideal of rationality’ which has ‘no echo in physical theory’ [Davidson 1980: 223, 231]. They 
are, as Jaspers says of empathic understanding, ideally typically meaningful connections. A 
subject is compared to an ideal of good thinking. This contrasts with subsumption of events 
under natural laws in which that normative dimension of what ought to happen is missing. 
Tailored to an understanding of persons, the elements of a narrative are mental states 
described in a rational pattern of propositional attitudes. 
The concepts of the propositional attitudes have their proper home in explanations of 
a special sort: explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to 
be, or to approximate to being, as they rationally ought to be. This is to be contrasted 
with a style of explanation in which one makes things intelligible by representing 
their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to 
happen. [McDowell 1985: 389] 
(This characterisation reveals why empathy can be more than mere imaginative recreation, to 
which point I promised to return. It is imaginative recreation of thinking in accord with the 
normative pattern of ideally typical, meaningful connections. The appreciation of why one 
thought or reaction is supported by another is what makes empathy sufficient of an 
achievement to count as a form of understanding.) 
Thirdly, anomalies are differently accounted for in normative and non-normative forms of 
understanding. If an explanation by subsumption under a natural law fails because 
observations of what has happened fail to fit the law then so much the worse either for the 
accuracy of observations or for the natural law. But this is not the case for narrative accounts 
where deviations from the standards of good reasoning can be accommodated as occasional 
lapses of judgement, perhaps explained by other aspects of the pattern which do accord with 
the standards. (One can, for example, form a mistaken belief for a good reason.) 
Despite this difference, narrative accounts are nevertheless couched in general terms and 
consequently there is no tension between adding such elements to comprehensive diagnosis 
and aiming for its validity. Thus if the supposedly idiographic elements that, in addition to 
general criteriological or nomological elements, make up comprehensive diagnosis are really 
narrative in this sense then they do add something genuinely distinct without risk to validity. 
They add a rational, normative form of understanding that has a different underlying logic to 
explanation by subsumption under natural laws. But whilst they help to outline individual 
human subjectivity by furnishing accounts that can be tailored to individual subjects, this is 
not to deny their implicit generality. The concepts that form narrative accounts can be applied 
in different ways to different subjects providing that the narratives so formed are shaped in 
recognisable rational patterns. 
Conclusions 
The call for a broader notion of formulation to augment a narrow criteriological model of 
diagnosis in psychiatry has recently been couched as a call for idiographic elements to be 
included. I have argued that this is misleading. If the reason for invoking idiographic elements 
is as a reaction against the charge that psychiatry pigeon-holes its subjects, it might seem that 
individualised or particular, by contrast with general, judgement is called for. But 
examination of the notion of idiographic judgement in Windelband’s seminal account 
suggests that the distinction between it and nomothetic judgement cannot be drawn. 
Idiographic judgement, construed as individualised judgement, is a myth. 
On the other hand, narrative judgement does seem to provide a genuine addition to a narrow 
model of psychiatric criteriological diagnosis. Narratives are essentially normatively 
structured, reason-based accounts of individual thought and action. They are the perspective 
from which a subject, as a person, comes into view. But, unlike supposed individualised 
judgements, they are essentially general and thus there is no a priori argument against their 
validity. 
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